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ABSTRACT
The threat of terrorism to Malaysia is growing. On June 2016, Malaysia suffered its very first confirmed ISIS-related 
casualty in a grenade attack on Movida Pub that resulted in the injury of eight people and by 2016, around 300 suspects 
were arrested and investigated due to allegation of involvement in terrorist activities. From the 261 detainees, 34 (33 
Malaysian, and one Indonesian) were charged under SOSMA and sent to Sungai Buloh prison for the remand period 
while waiting for their sentence. This paper is partly based on a year of interview and observation on the ideological 
inclination of the detainees. The observation reveals that the belief in the necessity to resurrect a global Islamic State 
with a Caliph to unite Muslims from all over the world under a single banner has been one of the major motivations 
for Muslim youths to join ISIS. The paper then proceeds with the uncovering and countering the logic of the Malaysian 
ISIS-related detainees that the resurrection of a global Islamic State caliphate is the only way to protect the interest of 
the Muslim community.
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ABSTRAK
Ancaman keganasan di Malaysia semakin berkembang. Pada Jun 2016, Malaysia turut menerima tempias kesan keganasan 
yang berkaitan dengan ISIS dalam serangan bom tangan di Movida Pub yang telah mengakibatkan kecederaan kepada 
lapan orang awam dan menjelang 2016, seramai 300 suspek telah ditangkap dan disiasat kerana dakwaan terlibat 
dalam kegiatan pengganas. Dari 261 tahanan, 34 (33 rakyat Malaysia, dan seorang Indonesia) telah didakwa di bawah 
SOSMA dan dihantar ke penjara Sungai Buloh untuk tempoh tahanan reman sambil menunggu hukuman. Makalah ini 
sebahagiannya adalah berdasarkan dapatan temu bual dan pemerhatian mengenai kecenderungan ideologi para tahanan. 
Pemerhatian mendedahkan bahawa kepercayaan dalam keperluan untuk membangkitkan semula sebuah Negara Islam 
global dengan Khalifah untuk menyatukan umat Islam dari seluruh dunia di bawah sepanduk tunggal telah menjadi salah 
satu motivasi utama bagi pemuda Islam untuk menyertai ISIS. Kertas ini kemudiannya diteruskan dengan mengupas dan 
menentang logik tahanan ISIS Malaysia bahawa kebangkitan khalifah negara Islam global adalah satu-satunya cara 
untuk melindungi kepentingan masyarakat Islam.
Kata kunci: Terrorisme; undang-undang; Malaysia; ISIS; Muslim
INTRODUCTION
According to the Institute of Economics and Peace, 
Malaysia has reached the 49th spot on the Global 
Terrorism Index 2015. It has climbed 42 spots 
within three years from being 91st in 2012. The 
same report also revealed that Malaysia’s score 
3.579 is on the lower scale of the index, in which 
zero denotes no impact of terrorism (Irsyad 2015). 
In 2015, Malaysia was one of the 50 countries most 
affected by terrorism. The Global Terrorism Index 
2016 ranks Malaysia better, at the 61st spot with the 
score of 2.691. However, the threat of terrorism is 
still serious in Malaysia. According to the sources 
from the Special Branch, there is an estimate of 90 
Malaysians fighting the wars in Iraq and Syria under 
different factions fighting. Most have been identified 
to be affiliated to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS).
ISIS IN MALAYSIA: AN ANALYSIS
Based on this alarming situation, the Malaysian 
government has enacted various new laws to curb 
terrorism based on the legal-security management 
measurement. As a result of the newly enacted laws 
and relentless effort by the Counterterrorism Unit, by 
August 2016, 261 individuals (239 Malaysians, and 
22 foreigners) were detained under different charges 
and Acts. The majority of Malaysia’s terrorism-
related arrests in 2015 were under SOSMA and penal 
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code chapters VI (Offenses Against the State) and VIa 
(Offenses Relating to Terrorism) (Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2015).
Malaysia has also been actively participating in 
regional and international efforts to combat terrorism. 
In 2015, Malaysia joined the Global Coalition to 
Counter ISIL. The Royal Malaysian Police Special 
Branch Counterterrorism Unit (Counterterrorism 
Unit) has the lead counterterrorism law enforcement 
role. However, despite the Counterterrorism Unit 
having carried out detentions and foiled many terrorist 
attacks in Malaysia, on 28 June 2016, Malaysia 
suffered it’s very first confirmed ISIS-related casualty 
in a grenade attack on Movida Pub in Puchong 
(outside Kuala Lumpur) that resulted in the injury of 
eight people (The Star Online 4 July 2016).
Shortly after, the Malaysian counterterrorism 
units have detained three alleged militants suspected 
of planning terror attacks across the country on the 
eve of the country’s Independence Day’s celebration. 
According to the security force, they were targeting 
Hindu temples across the nation (Malay Mail Online 
31 August 2016).
From the 261 detainees, 34 (33 Malaysian, and 
one Indonesian) were charged under SOSMA and 
sent to Sungai Buloh prison for the remand period 
while waiting for their sentence. During their remand 
period in Sungai Buloh prison, the prison’s counseling 
unit had initiated a specially designed rehabilitation 
program that was initially organized fortnightly, but 
later became weekly. Due to the important and critical 
nature of the rehabilitation program, the counseling 
unit through the consent of the director of the prison, 
had invited Dr. Maszlee Malik, a specialist in Islamic 
Studies, Islamic Political Thoughts, and Global 
Islamic Movements from the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia.
During the rehabilitation sessions since August 
2015, topics beyond religious issues were discussed. 
Arts, culture, language, economy, entertainment, local 
politics, Middle Eastern conflicts, history, thoughts, 
philosophy, and others were amongst the topics 
discussed with the detainees. When the detainees were 
pushed out of their comfort zone, they began to realize 
the complexities of life and the colorful nature of the 
world they are living in, hence prompting them to re-
evaluate the position they have taken. The sessions 
were conducted away from a hostile approach, and 
any judgemental language was avoided to allow the 
detainees to feel more receptive towards the subjects 
discussed.
The approach was inspired by the suggestion of 
anthropologist Scott Atran, who in his speech at the 
United Nations indicated that the only way to fight 
against radicalization is to borrow psychological 
strategies straight out of ISIS’s playbook. According to 
Atran, any successful plan must “offer youth something 
that makes them dream, of a life of significance 
through struggle and sacrifice in comradeship.” He 
added that the key is to offer disillusioned youth 
something just as exciting (but significantly less 
destructive and terrible than becoming a terrorist) and 
the realization that “the first step to combating ISIS is 
to understand it” (Krisch 2015).
Based on a year of observation on the ideological 
inclination of the detainees, a conclusion is made in 
this paper that the belief in the necessity to resurrect 
a global Islamic State with a Caliph to unite Muslims 
from all over the world under a single banner has been 
one of the major motivations for Muslim youths to 
join ISIS.
ISIS AND THE KHALIFAH (CALIPHATE) 
STATE DISCOURSE
On 26 May 2014, IS or initially known as ISIS (Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria) successfully launched an 
attack on an Iraqi military base in Anbar. A Malaysian 
fighter, Ahmad Tarmimi Maliki was responsible as 
the suicide bomber who opened the way for other IS 
fighters to enter and seize the army base which was 
full of arms and military vehicles (The Star Online 
14 June 2014).
The operation marked the expansion of ISIS into 
wider Iraqi territory, hence giving IS the confidence to 
declare itself as a state, and renamed the organisation 
to ‘Islamic State’ (IS) instead of ISIS. The Shura 
council (supreme council) of IS then unanimously 
agreed to elect Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi to be the 
Khalifah or the ‘Caliph’ of Muslims worldwide 
(Abdul Bari 2015).
On 5 July 2014, al-Baghdadi appeared on the 
pulpit of al-Nouri mosque in Mosul province, Northern 
Iraq; proclaiming himself as the ‘Caliph’ for Muslims 
and officially announcing the establishment of a 
‘Caliphate State’ for Muslims. He then strongly urged 
Muslims who share the same aspiration to migrate to 
their territory, perform the oath of homage (Bay’ah) to 
the Caliph, or at least support the ‘real Islamic State’ 
that will expand its dominance throughout Muslims 
lands (Middle East Star 5 July 2014).
The declaration had been celebrated with joy 
by IS sympathizers from all over the world. The 
fascination was followed by ‘online’ bay’ah (oath 
of homage) events performed by IS followers and 
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sympathizers from all over the globe, including 
some Muslim youths in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
By giving the ‘bay’ah’, these individuals agreed to 
support and follow any orders given by the Caliph, 
and give their loyalty only to the ‘Caliphate State’ 
called the ‘Islamic State’ or in Arabic ‘al-Dawlah 
al-Islamiyyah’ (Da’esh). 
Despite the wide range of topics and discussions 
during the sessions with SOSMA detainees, since the 
third session, most of the detainees kept raising the 
issue of the importance of Caliphate state for Muslims 
globally. For most of them (with the exception 
of two detainees who remained ambiguous until 
their sentence), a united Caliph for Muslims is the 
central issue for contemporary Muslims. To them, 
the responsibility to establish and be affiliated with 
a ‘united Caliph’ ruling the united Muslim land 
under the banner of a ‘Caliphate state’ or ‘Dawlah 
Islamiyyah’ (Islamic State) is imperative towards all 
Muslims. They strongly assumed that the existence 
of such a state would not only serve as an imperative 
to Muslims, but will also be the solution to many 
problems faced by Muslims globally at present. With 
that assumption, they believe that the emergence of 
IS as a caliphate state for all Muslims is legit and 
necessary.
In justifying the need for a Caliphate state and 
a united Caliph as a supreme leader for all Muslims 
around the world, most of the detainees quoted several 
Prophetic traditions; but most of their justifications 
instead came from their perception of reality. They 
believe that a Caliphate state could provide the 
remedy for the current perceived global injustice 
towards Muslims.
They often quoted the issue of Palestine, the 
endless crisis in Iraq, the mass massacre of Rohingyan 
Muslims in Myanmar, the mass killing of Muslims in 
Central Africa as classic examples of how Muslims 
need a powerful leader to unite them under the 
umbrella of a Caliphate to improve the conditions 
of their Muslim brethrens who are victims in the 
aforementioned conflict areas. On a similar basis, 
most of the detainees argue about the different 
treatment accorded by the international community 
to Bashar al-Asad and his armies who have on their 
hands, the life of 250,000 innocent civilians, while 4 
million became refugee. Despite all those, Bashar and 
his armies have never been identified and labeled by 
the international community as ‘terrorist.’ They also 
implied the Rab’a massacre committed by General 
al-Sisi during his coup de tat on the democratically 
elected president, Mohammad al-Morsi which caused 
the death of thousands of innocent lives and put 
thousands other in prison including the ministers and 
members of parliaments with dissent voice. For them, 
the coup de tat in Egypt proves that democracy will 
never work in Muslim countries.
They believe that the current ‘Islamic State’ 
in Iraq and Syria fulfills the imaginary utopian 
‘Islamic’ abode that they always dream of; in which 
justice could prevail, and only the competent will 
be given the responsibility to rule with Shari’ah 
Laws. Furthermore, IS comes with a complete 
package of Islamic prerequisites of a Caliphate state 
prophesied by the Prophet Muhammad in some of 
his eschatological traditions. This Islamic State is 
believed to be the only ‘Messiah’ that could save 
Muslims from the ‘dajjal’ (anti-Christ), according 
to their literal interpretation of some prophecies by 
Prophet Muhammad about the End of Day.
In many occurrences too, the detainees would 
be reflecting on the social condition of Malaysia and 
other Muslim countries which, according to them, is 
full of sinful activities and corruption. This condition, 
according to them, is due to the refusal of Muslim 
leaders, including Malaysian leaders, to implement 
Shari’ah law and to establish the Caliphate state. 
They suppose that, if there is a Caliphate state, those 
sinful conditions would be eradicated with force by 
using Islamic Criminal Laws (hudud). Consequently, 
they also believe that Western so-called democratic 
power has failed humanity; hence democracy is only 
a tool of the powers-that-be for their own interest. 
Furthermore, most of them believe that Muslims are 
now being the target of the global conspiracy of the 
Jews and the Christian crusaders.
Despite the unanimous consensus amongst the 
detainees on the ‘urgency’ of re-establishing the 
Caliphate state with a single leader of the Muslim 
nation, the foundations of the belief somewhat vary. 
For those who have been recruited by groups related 
to al-Qaeda or IS (in Malaysia), they would usually 
have a fixed mindset, due to the indoctrination; hence, 
it became a religious conviction that is hard to change. 
As for the few who were radicalized through the social 
media, their belief could still be challenged through 
rational arguments of historical facts and religious 
explanations.
The different levels of understanding and belief in 
the topic could be seen clearly during the discussions. 
Surprisingly, out of the 34 detainees, only one of them 
possessed a comprehensive picture of the details of 
Islamic rulings relating to the topic of Khalifah as 
being debated by Muslim jurists. The rest of the 
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detainees, on the other hand, were merely subscribing 
to a hollow sentimental-based vision of the Caliphate 
state and a unified Caliph for Muslim nation.
In the attempt to clarify the un-Islamic nature 
of the IS Caliphate to the detainees, the detainees 
were told about the views of many contemporary 
Muslim scholars towards IS and that most prominent 
scholars from all over the world have been heavily 
refuting the declaration of the Caliphate state of IS. 
For example, in August 2014, the Grand Mufti of 
Saudi Arabia dismissed IS’s claim on the Caliphate 
and labeled both IS and al-Qaeda as enemies of 
Islam. Additionally, the World Federation of Muslim 
Scholars, through its leader, the famous Qatar-based 
Egyptian Islamic scholar, Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
declared that the IS declaration of a Caliphate state, 
along with Baghdadi’s declaration of the Caliphate ‘is 
totally un-Islamic and is void under the true teaching 
of Islam’ (Aljazeera 7 July 2014).
Similarly, in September 2014, 126 top Muslim 
scholars from all over the world issued an open letter to 
the ‘self-proclaimed Caliph’ al-Baghdadi, denouncing 
his Caliphate and denouncing IS for committing 
numerous crimes and transgressions under the name 
of religion (Daily Sabah 25 September 2014).
Interestingly, the acceptance of the detainees to 
these statements varied. Some argued that the scholars 
involved in the condemnation of IS do not understand 
the situation in Syria. Few others challenged the 
authority and credentials of these scholars on the 
ground that they have never participated in jihad, thus 
that alone turned them into armchair commentators. 
About five of the detainees believed that these 
scholars were co-opted scholars, or what they called 
as ‘scholars for dollars.’ Quite a significant number 
of the detainees chose not to take any stance saying 
that they needed more time to contemplate further 
on the issue, while at the same time asking for an 
alternative to the caliphate system that they believed 
in to overcome the current situation and predicament 
of Muslims all over the world. This was so because, 
according to them, it is useless to condemn the IS 
Caliphate if those scholars fail to provide a better 
solution.
DECONSTRUCTING THE CALIPHATE STATE 
DISCOURSE
The call for the re-establishment of a united Caliphate 
state is not a new phenomenon. Since the collapse of 
the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey in 1924, there were 
few international attempts to revive a Caliphate state 
beyond the borders given to Muslim land under the 
international framework of the ‘nation state’ or the 
‘territorial state.’
Rashid Redha (1865-1935) was amongst the 
earliest Muslim thinkers who initiated an international 
effort to revive the Caliphate institution by establishing 
the “Khilafah Movement” which consisted of Muslim 
scholars from different parts of the world. However, 
the movement ended in the year 1935 with his demise 
amid the movement’s failure to find someone who 
is suitable to be the ‘unifying’ Caliph for Muslims 
worldwide. Redha’s ideal for a Caliphate state was 
spelled clearly in his monumental book, al-Khilafah 
aw al-Imamah al-Uzma (The Caliphate or the Grand 
Leader) (Enayat 2000, Belén 2008).
His vision was continued by his disciple, Hassan 
al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the Jamaat 
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) 
movement in Egypt (Nafi 2010).
Although Hassan’s vision for the Caliphate state 
was not explicitly made as the sole vision of the 
movement, however, it has always been the long-
term vision of the movement until today, despite the 
different countries from which it is operating and the 
different names given to the movement’s branches 
globally (Helbawy 2010).
The only difference between al-Banna’s vision 
and Redha’s is that the former emphasized more on 
the reform of the society through providing Islamic 
education, welfare and local political participation in 
wherever it is operating – unlike Redha’s which was 
more of a trans-border political movement that aimed 
only to re-establish the Caliphate institution. 
However, the real foundational idea of re-
establishing a contemporary Caliphate state as a 
religious imperative was formulated by the Pakistani-
Indian Islamists’ ideologue and founder of the famous 
Sub-Continent Islamic movement, Jamaat-i-Islami, 
Abul A’la al-Maududi (1903-1979). In his numerous 
writings, he insisted on the need of Muslims to 
establish an Islamic state to uphold God sovereignty 
(Hakimiyatullah) through the implementation of 
comprehensive Islamic systems in the life of the 
people (Mandeville 2014).
However, al-Maududi’s vision was incomplete 
without the works and the rhetorics of the famous 
Egyptian-born Islamist ideologue, Syed Qutb 
(1906-1966). Qutb further enshrined al-Maududi’s 
arguments with his rethoric by giving a theological 
arguments deduced from Quranic verses. This can be 
seen explicitly in his discussions on the verses from 
chapter five (al-Maidah) of the Quran in his Quranic 
exegesis, ‘Fi Zilal al-Quran.’
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He insisted that Islamic political identity to 
Muslims is equivalent to their belief and creed. As 
for Qutb, the re-establishment of an Islamic state to 
uphold ‘Hakimiyatullah’ (God sovereignty) is part 
of Muslims’ creed, in which its rejection by any 
Muslim individual is equal to the rejection of Islam as 
a whole. In both his famous Quranic exegesis called 
‘Fi Zilal al-Quran’ (Under the Shade of al-Quran) 
which he authored during his imprisonment, and his 
monumental ‘Ma’alim fi al-Tariq’ (Milestones), Qutb 
laid down theological arguments as the foundations 
of the urgency and imperative nature of a Caliphate 
state (Qutb 1994, Qutb 1983).
Qutb and his works were often quoted by those 
who believe in the necessity of the re-establishment 
of a ‘Caliphate state.’
Another serious effort worth mentioning here 
is the movement established by a Palestinian-born 
Muslim scholar, Taqiyuddin Nabhani (1909-1977), 
who founded the ‘Hizb ut tahrir’ (Liberation Party). 
The movement not only shared the same aspiration of 
Redha’s, but also made its raison de etre to re-establish 
the Caliphate state through its unique method which 
the followers claimed had been inspired by the life 
and the struggle of Prophet Muhammad (Al-Nabhani 
2002, Al-Nabhani 1999).
This movement, similar to Muslim Brotherhood, 
operates internationally across the borders and has 
its own significant impacts to security and political 
concerns of some countries all around the world. 
It aims to establish a Caliphate State through 
propaganda, and assistance from the foreign power 
without using violence.
The closest group which shares similar aspirations 
with Hizb ut tahrir on the re-establishment of a 
‘Caliphate State,’ and working towards it, is Al-
Qaeda, which was established by Osama ben Laden 
(1957-2011) and Abu Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951-). 
The big difference is Al-Qaeda is fine with using 
violence to achieve its goal while Hizb ut tahrir is 
non-violence in nature.
In many of Al-Qaeda’s statements, both figures 
kept reiterating the group vision and their belief that 
the ‘united Caliphate State’ is imminent due to the 
Prophet’s prophecy; and that Al-Qaeda is working 
towards it by adopting ‘jihad’ or arm struggle as its 
sole means to bring this vision into reality (Atwan 
2009).
Al-Qaeda’s vision and mission have been echoed 
by its direct offshoot, IS or ISIS, or ISIL, or in its 
Arabic term, al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq wa 
Bilad al-Sham (Islamic State in Iraq and Levant) 
(Madeville 2014).
The difference between ISIS and the rest of the 
movements is that it managed to crystallize the 
‘utopia’ by declaring a real ‘state’ of their own, 
with its own armies, bureaucracy, people, economic 
instruments, its own ‘Shariah’ legal system (hudud), 
and most important of all, it has a Caliph, whom the 
followers strongly believe is representing Muslims 
all around the world (Atwan, p. 188).
As for many of the detainees, this situation has 
led them to feel that the emergence of ISIS with its 
Caliph, al-Baghdadi is a dream come true situation. 
It is the answer to Muslims prayers. It is the Messiah 
whom the Muslims have waited since 1924 to save 
Muslims from their current malaise and miserable 
condition. With this euphoria, those amongst the 
detainees who decided to go to Syria feel that they 
no longer have ties with the non-Shariatic Malaysia, 
since they are already linking themselves with the full 
Shariah-compliant ‘legitimate’ Islamic State. Their 
plan for migration to ISIS is part of what they believe 
as ‘Hijrah’ (religious migration) to the abode of 
Islam, where the ‘real Islamic life’ exist. This state of 
confusion led to the feeling of euphoria for migration 
amongst those who share the same sentiment with the 
detainees and most of Malaysians who are already in 
Syria or Iraq joining the IS. For them, the legitimate 
leader of Muslims is the Caliph of the IS, al-Baghdadi, 
and he alone has the authority to declare war and 
enact any Islamic rulings related to the political life 
of Muslims globally.
In short, similar to many other Islamists, the 
failure to acknowledge the legitimacy of the current 
territorial state framework, in reality, will lead them 
towards imagining a utopian ‘Caliphate state’ across 
current borders of Muslim countries. Consequently, it 
will also further them to disacknowledge the leaders 
elected of the countries, hence dismissing these 
leaders’ legitimacy over the political, economic and 
social life of the people. Hence, according to such 
paradigm, the life of Muslims in any Muslim countries 
is not considered Shari’ah-compliant, and therefore 
they need to strive to re-establish the Caliphate that 
will bring the real legitimacy of power for Muslims 
i.e. enforcing the Shari’atic life. Otherwise, to 
them, the political life of Muslims would never be 
considered Islamic. Based on this paradigm too, those 
who subscribe to such a vision will never feel loyal to 
neither the ‘country’ they live in nor the other citizens 
who they live with. This is where the problem lies.
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JIHAD ISSUE: A DISCUSSION
In one of the rehab sessions, the topic of jihad was 
discussed. Amongst the important subjects in jihad is 
the conditions and stipulations of jihad (Al-Qaradawi 
2009).
According to Muslim jurists,  based on 
many traditions of Prophet Muhammad, one of 
the stipulations of jihad, according to Islamic 
jurisprudence, is the call for jihad from the head of 
state (Ahmad Ghazi 2010), which is in accordance to 
many constitutions of many modern countries in the 
world. When the detainees were told that in Malaysia, 
according to the fiqh al-Jihad (the rulings of Jihad), 
nobody could declare war and send armies to war 
except the highest leader of Malaysian army, with 
the consent of the King (Yang di-Pertuan Agong), 
because he is considered the supreme leader of the 
country, or the Islamic term ‘ulil amri’ (literally 
translated as ‘The one who possesses the authority’), 
some of them disagrees since he is not considered by 
them as a Caliph (Al-Arabiyyah 29 July 2014).
The vision for an Islamic state or Caliphate state 
uniting all Muslims is not grounded on reality and 
historical facts. Since the establishment of Abbasid 
Caliphate in the year 750CE (132AH), Muslims then 
have been living under two caliphs. One belonged 
to the Abbasid, who was based in Iraq, while the 
other was the Andalusian-based Umayyad Caliph. 
Furthermore, during the classical days, before the 
years of colonialization, Muslims had kings, emirs, 
and imams who ruled their own lands, emirates and 
territories far away from the Turkish Ottoman Caliph, 
without denying the power and influence of the 
Ottoman empire that used to rule many parts of what 
is currently known as the Middle East and Northern 
Africa. However, these parts of history were not taken 
into the discourse of the Islamists in their thoughts 
and deliberation on the envisioned Caliphate State. 
Furthermore, those who read the situation of Ottoman 
Caliphate towards the end of its reign would realize 
that Muslim reformists at the end of the 19th century 
had been calling for a democratic rule, independent 
from the colonials, and a just state to replace the weak 
Ottoman Empire which ruled its territory through 
corrupt governors (Haddad 1999).
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), the teacher of 
Redha, and the prominent 19th century reformist from 
Egypt, when was asked by his disciple, Redha to write 
a foreword in his book on Caliphate, commented that 
‘Muslims don’t need any Imam (Caliph) nowadays 
apart from the Quran, any discussions about this issue 
will further divide them rather than benefitting their 
life.” (Rashid Redha 2008).
CONCLUSION
There are six major points that can be concluded 
from the observation. The first one is on the level of 
understanding of Islam on the part of detainees. The 
level of understanding and knowledge is minimal and 
superficial. It wold be wrong to assume that those 
inclined to join militant or illegal armed activities to 
possess in-depth knowledge of the history of Islm, 
its political system or the concept of fiqh in details.
The selective readings on Muslim history, and the 
lack of criticism while looking at the bigger picture 
of Islamic history while reading it, has led not only 
those detainees but many Muslims alike to arrive at a 
partial understanding of Islamic political thought and 
the Caliphate institution itself (Olivier 2004).
During the rehab discussions, many of the 
detainees would be surprised to read and discover 
that there was no linear trajectory of what they 
understood as the ‘Caliphate State’ in Islamic 
history. By presenting insights of critical scholars, 
and exposing them to the comprehensive history of 
Muslims without being selective, they were surprised 
to learn that the vision they used to subscribe to was 
just one of the responses of Muslim thinkers towards 
colonialism and colonial projects.
Secondly, it is possible to correct, influence and 
change the mindset of the detainees from justifying 
violence activities and adhering to dogmatic and 
rigid institutional ideology to the idea that Islam is a 
religion that promotes peacein accordance with the 
concept of ‘rahmatan lil alamin’ (blessings to the 
whole universe). Introducing the detainees to the 
notion of Islam as a set of value and ethical principles 
rather than a dogmatic institutional ideology limited 
in the realm of politics was rather helpful in helping 
them revisit their initial position towards the issue 
of Caliphate State. Rashid Ghannouchi (1993) and 
Sa’ededin Uthmani (2009) versions of the separation 
between the realm of religion and the realm of politics 
would be helpful too; since both of them departed 
from Islamic epistemology and came from Islamic 
tradition. Both thinkers offered a more realistic role 
of religion (Islam) as a set of values and ethics for 
Muslims to embrace the common modern political 
principles of justice, freedom, accountability, people’s 
empowerment, good governance and democracy. 
Both of them emphasized on the realization of the 
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highest objectives of Shari’ah to be achieved in the 
political realm, which for them is a neutral space; 
rather than the vision to bring some classical and 
archaic institutions of the past into present reality.
Thirdly, it is essential to continuously educate 
the detainees and open their minds to the flexibility 
and kindness of Islam. Instead of forcing the younger 
Muslim generation subscribe to the vision of the re-
establishment of a Caliphate state to abandon their 
‘radical ideology,’ opening new horizons before their 
eyes would be a better way in convincing them to 
retrospect and re-evaluate their mindset. 
Fourthly, there is an urgent need to produce and 
expose the public at large to constructive and positive 
literature on Islam to dispel the myth that Islam is a 
religion that promotes or tolerates violence. Lack of 
available literature on the subject written in Bahasa 
Melayu and in popular publications might make 
it difficult for the detainees to embrace the new 
dimensions offered to them. The scarcity of literature 
produced by local Muslim scholars on the subject 
too proves to be another impediment to educate and 
encourage the young Muslims who might subscribe to 
the radical ideology of al-Qaeda or IS to analytically 
examine their radical thought concerning Islam and 
politics. 
Thus, it is timely for local Muslim scholars to 
produce popular literatures dealing with the issue 
and replacing the conventional Islamists’ discourse 
of Khalifah and the Caliphate State with a new 
and progressive one. The acknowledgement of 
the legitimacy and Shari’ah-compliance of current 
‘territorial nation-states’ by Muslims scholars is of 
the utmost importance, not only for Malaysians, but 
also for Muslims living in majority non-Muslims 
states like those in Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Australia and other Western countries.
Fifthly, it is essential that the discourse on the 
political relation between Muslims and non-Muslims 
be developed further by taking into account modern 
challenges and reality. Classical discourse on the 
political relation between the Muslims and non-
Muslims such as the demarcation of non-Muslims 
living within a majority Muslims country to Kafir 
Dhimmi (good infidels) and Kafir Harbi (Bad Infidels 
to be fought) is very counter-productive in the current 
set-up of consitutional-based modern state. New 
contemporary Islamic discourses on the legitimacy of 
citizenship in a constitutional state, which has been 
popularized by many moderate scholars such as al-
Ghannouchi, Fahmi Huweydi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
Tariq Ramadhan, Muhammad Imarah, Jasser ‘Audah 
and the like should be dominating the political 
mindset of Muslims in dealing with the issues of 
citizenship and statecraft. 
Sixthly, in order to further persuade the public 
to adopt constructive and positive interpretation of 
Islam, it is necessary to develop scholars with the 
necessary credentials. There are certain efforts and 
critiques by Muslim academics from the West on 
the topic, as well as their onslaught criticism on the 
classical pieces (An-Naim 2008, Hallaq 2013).
However, it must be noted that general Muslims, 
or to be more precise, the conservatives and moderate 
Islamists alike would only buy in to the argument if 
the line of reasoning on these matters are derived from 
certain Islamic epistemology by well-known Islamic 
studies scholars with the necessary credentials. 
Likewise, it is also important for these scholars 
to produce more writings to convince Muslims in 
general on the legitimacy of the current territorial 
state, and to debunk the myth that the Caliphate state 
and united Caliph for Muslims worldwide is the sole 
solution to all problems faced by Muslims nowadays, 
simply because the history has proven otherwise. 
These writings are important to save the younger 
Muslim younger generation from becoming preys to 
a radical ideology which eventually would lead them 
towards extremism and violence. This new alternative 
discourse too is important to bring Islam forward as 
a useful set of values for nation-building and for the 
common good of the World.
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